Skip to content
Business in China

Why US Brands Are So Popular in China (And Where They Are Losing)

Olivier VEROT
Founder · Updated July 22, 2026
Why US Brands Are So Popular in China (And Where They Are Losing)

American brands used to walk into China with a built-in advantage. The flag on the packaging did half the selling. That is over. Since the trade war, the tariff rounds and the rise of guochao, the US label has stopped being an argument on its own. But the picture is not uniformly bad: some categories are still growing double digits with American brands leading them, while others have collapsed. This article separates the two.

About the author. I am Olivier Verot, founder of GMA. I have been in Shanghai since 2012 and I have taken more than a hundred American brands into China, from supplement makers and skincare labs to outdoor gear and premium food, through Tmall Global, JD, Douyin and WeChat. I have also watched several of them leave. LinkedIn.

The market that made US brands rich is not the market they face today

The old story went like this. China has a middle class of a few hundred million people, their incomes keep rising, they distrust local products after a decade of food and cosmetics scandals, and they will pay a premium for anything imported. That story was true for roughly fifteen years. It built the China business of Starbucks, Nike, Apple, P&G and a long tail of smaller American brands.

Three things broke it. First, Chinese domestic brands caught up on quality, not just on price. Anta and Li-Ning develop their own cushioning technology. Proya and Florasis run their own R&D labs. By-Health sells more supplements in China than any imported brand. When the local option is genuinely good, “imported” stops being a shortcut for “better”.

Second, guochao. What started around 2018 as a fashion trend for Chinese design motifs has matured into a default preference among consumers born after 1995. Buying local is not a sacrifice for them. It is a normal, sometimes proud, choice.

Third, the trade war made “American” a politically visible attribute. Not toxic, but visible. In a market where a Weibo pile-on can wipe out a quarter of sales in ten days, visible is a risk you have to manage.

US brands in China country of origin ranking
Country of origin used to be a ranking. In 2026 it is a filter at best, and only in some categories.

What the tariff rounds actually changed

Most brand managers I talk to have a vague idea that “there are tariffs”. They rarely know which ones apply to them. Here is the state of play as of mid-2026.

After the Trump and Xi meeting in Busan on 30 October 2025, both sides stepped back. The US brought its reciprocal rate on Chinese goods down to 10 percent and dropped the additional fentanyl-related 10 percent. In exchange, China suspended the retaliatory tariffs announced from 4 March 2025, including the 15 percent on chicken, wheat, corn and cotton and the 10 percent on soybeans and sorghum. That truce runs to 10 November 2026, and the USTR extended exclusions on 178 product categories to the same date. China Briefing keeps a running table of the current rates. Check it before you quote a landed price to a distributor.

In agriculture the damage was already done. A study covered by the University of Illinois found China’s retaliatory duties wiped out about $14.9 billion of US agricultural export sales between March 2025 and February 2026, soybeans worst hit. Suspension is not removal, and Brazilian supply took the volume American farmers lost. Buyers who switch under duress rarely switch back for sentiment.

Two consequences for a consumer brand. A truce with an expiry date is not a plan: if your China P&L only works at 10 percent, model it at 30 and see whether you still want to be there. And tariffs hit general trade imports far harder than cross-border e-commerce, which is why the entry route matters more than it used to.

Categories where American brands are still winning

Health supplements and nutrition

This is the strongest position American brands hold in China today, and it is not close. According to WPIC data presented in June 2026, 54 percent of Chinese consumer spending on health supplements goes to foreign brands, with American and Australian labels leading that foreign share. China’s online nutraceutical market was worth around $17 billion in 2025 and grew 14 percent year on year. The cross-border slice of it grew 20 percent.

Why does the American label still work here and nowhere else? Because supplements are a trust purchase where the consumer cannot verify the product. FDA-adjacent language, third-party lab testing, GMP certification and a US clinical study are readable proof points. Chinese consumers do not trust the US government more than their own, they trust an audit trail they can check on Xiaohongshu. That is a very different thing from patriotism.

China dietary supplements market for imported brands
Supplements are the one category where “made in the USA” still converts, because it stands in for verifiable testing rather than national image.

One warning. GACC Order 280 took effect on 1 June 2026 and changed the customs regime for imported health foods. Auxiliary ingredient declarations became mandatory, and supervision moved from a pre-approval check to continuous risk-based monitoring of the whole chain. Several brands I know got caught with label files that had been copy-pasted from their 2023 filings. Budget for a compliance review before you budget for media.

Skincare and colour cosmetics, in the science segment

Mass American beauty has lost ground to Proya, Winona and Comfy. But the ingredient-led, dermatologist-positioned end of the market still favours US brands: retinol, peptides, acid exfoliation, anything where the consumer wants a molecule and a percentage rather than a mood.

Chinese beauty buyers in 2026 read INCI lists. They compare concentrations. They screenshot clinical results and post them. This works in favour of any brand with real formulation credentials and against any brand selling a lifestyle. If you sell skincare, the shift is covered in more detail in our overview of the Chinese cosmetics and beauty market for foreign brands.

Premium food and beverage

Not commodity agriculture, which the tariffs destroyed. Branded premium food: nut butters, protein snacks, craft spirits, specialty coffee beans, pet food, functional drinks. These move through cross-border channels, carry a story, and sit in a price band where a 10 to 20 percent duty is absorbable. Pet nutrition is the fastest-growing cross-border import category in China, ahead of supplements, and American brands hold a strong share of the premium end. Chinese pet owners apply to their animals the same import bias they have started to abandon for themselves.

Outdoor and technical sport, not mass sportswear

Here the split inside a single sector is brutal. Nike’s Greater China sales fell 12 percent in its fiscal fourth quarter of 2026, after several quarters of decline, and the company guided to continued weakness. Adidas and even Arc’teryx saw Chinese sales soften. Mass sportswear is being taken apart by Anta, Li-Ning and Xtep on price, distribution and speed.

Meanwhile technical outdoor is booming. Camping, hiking, trail running, climbing, snow sports. American brands with genuine technical heritage in those niches are growing, because the Chinese outdoor consumer is new, is buying gear for the first time, and wants the brand the experienced people use. Positioning matters more than nationality. If you sell apparel or footwear, our guide to marketing a sportswear brand in China covers how that split plays out channel by channel.

Consumer tech, in narrow segments

Smartphones went to Huawei, Xiaomi and Honor. Wearables went to Huawei. But audio, gaming peripherals, creator hardware and home fitness equipment still favour American design brands. The rule is the same as everywhere: if a Chinese competitor can copy the function and beat you on price, you lose. If your value sits in a specific engineering choice or a community, you hold.

Categories that are genuinely suffering

Fast fashion. Foreign fast fashion has been in retreat for years and the trade war only accelerated it. Shein, Taobao and the domestic live-commerce sellers run faster cycles at lower prices. We wrote about the mechanics in why foreign fast-fashion brands keep failing in China. Nothing has improved since.

Bulk agriculture. Soybeans, sorghum, corn, cotton, poultry. These are commodities. When a duty makes you 13 percent more expensive than Brazil, there is no brand argument to make.

Automotive. Tesla’s cumulative China retail sales for January to April 2026 fell 15 percent year on year, and its share of the NEV retail market dropped to around 3 percent in April, its lowest since November 2025. SAIC-GM, the General Motors joint venture that once sold two million cars a year in China, saw volumes collapse through 2025. The problem is not the tariff. BYD, Xiaomi, NIO and Xpeng ship better software, faster refresh cycles and lower prices. Our article on the electric vehicle market in China covers where foreign carmakers still have room.

Mid-market coffee and restaurant chains. Starbucks is fighting Luckin and Cotti on a price ladder it did not design. Every American food service concept entering China now faces a domestic clone within eighteen months, at 60 percent of the price.

Cross-border e-commerce is the entry door, and it is a different business

China’s cross-border e-commerce trade reached 2.75 trillion yuan in 2025 according to the General Administration of Customs, up 69.7 percent on 2020. For an American brand testing the market, the mechanism matters.

You sell without a Chinese entity, without a local ICP licence and without full domestic product registration. A supplement sold cross-border skips the Blue Hat registration that takes eighteen months and six figures. A cosmetic skips the domestic filing. Stock sits in a bonded warehouse in Zhengzhou, Ningbo or Hainan, goods clear on order, and the consumer is legally the importer.

Cross-border e-commerce versus general trade in China
Cross-border and general trade are not two speeds of the same road. They have different tax treatment, different registration duties and different ceilings.

It also caps you. Per-transaction and annual purchase limits apply to each consumer, you cannot sell through offline retail, and you cannot make certain efficacy claims. Brands that succeed cross-border eventually hit a wall and have to convert to general trade. The rules on that conversion changed again, and we covered them in what the 2026 CBEC law changes for foreign brands.

My advice has been the same for three years. Start cross-border, spend twelve to eighteen months proving there is real repeat demand, then pay for domestic registration once the data justifies it. Doing it in the other order is how brands burn a million dollars on a Tmall flagship store that nobody visits.

The American label is not an argument any more. Your proof is.

In the US you are famous. In Europe you are known. In China you start from zero, and in 2026 you start from zero with a country tag that no longer carries you.

Brand perception still decides everything in China. It signals social standing and it substitutes for product verification in a market where counterfeits are still common. Chinese consumers buy brands they identify with, and that identification creates real loyalty. What changed is what earns it.

Ten years ago, “American brand, established 1978, sold in 40 countries” was enough to earn a trial. Today the consumer wants a different set of proofs: ingredient transparency, third-party testing, real user reviews from people who look like her, a founder who shows his face, and an answer to “why is this better than the Chinese one at half the price”. If you cannot answer that last question in one sentence, do not enter.

Step one: e-reputation before spend

Before you buy a single impression, make sure that a consumer who searches your brand name finds something. In practice that means four things.

  1. Genuine reviews on Xiaohongshu, written by real users, not a hundred identical posts published in one week.
  2. Chinese online press coverage, so that the brand exists outside its own channels.
  3. A clean brand-name result on Baidu, including a Baike page, so that nothing negative or empty occupies page one.
  4. Product seeding with small creators who actually test the product and say something specific about it.
Branding for US brands in China
Reputation first, awareness second. Spending on reach before the search results are clean is the most common way American brands waste their first China budget.

Only then do you buy reach: Baidu paid search for people already looking, KOC campaigns for word of mouth, Douyin and Xiaohongshu placement for exposure. That sequence has not changed since we started the agency in 2012. What changed is where the discovery happens.

What builds an American brand in China in 2026

Five mechanisms matter now that did not exist, or barely existed, when this article was first written.

Generative engine optimisation on DeepSeek and Doubao

A large share of Chinese product research now starts with an AI assistant rather than a search box. DeepSeek is embedded in WeChat search, Doubao across ByteDance apps. When a consumer asks “which American vitamin D brand is trustworthy”, the model composes an answer from Chinese-language sources it has ingested: Baidu Baike, Zhihu threads, Xiaohongshu posts, e-commerce Q&A, trade press.

This is not SEO. You do not rank, you get cited. So the work is to publish structured, factual Chinese-language content stating plainly what your product is, what it contains, who it is for and what the evidence is, in the places these models actually read. Comparison content performs best, because that is the shape of the question being asked. We looked at the DeepSeek integration in practice in our piece on WeChat and DeepSeek for brand marketing.

Xiaohongshu as a search engine, not a social network

Chinese women under 40 researching a supplement, a serum or a jacket search Xiaohongshu first. The platform ranks notes on engagement quality and keyword match, so your job is to occupy the specific queries your buyer types, not to accumulate followers. That means a lot of small, specific, keyword-anchored notes from many accounts, rather than a beautiful brand feed. More on how the platform works in our Xiaohongshu explainer.

Xiaohongshu Little Red Book interface
Xiaohongshu is where an imported product is checked before it is bought, whatever platform the transaction happens on.

WeChat private domain

Platform traffic costs keep rising. Private domain means moving buyers into WeChat groups and a company account you control, so that the second purchase costs you nothing in media. For imported supplements and skincare, where repurchase cycles are 30 to 60 days, this is where the margin is. A brand doing 40 percent of revenue through private domain has a fundamentally different business from one buying every sale.

Douyin interest e-commerce

On Tmall, the consumer arrives with intent. On Douyin, the algorithm creates the intent by putting a product in front of someone who was not looking for it. That suits demonstrable products: a supplement with a visible result, a gadget, a piece of gear. It suits brand-story products badly. Many foreign brands are shifting budget in that direction, and we described the trade-offs in why brands are leaving Tmall for Douyin.

KOC and affiliate, instead of one big KOL

One top-tier livestreamer costs six figures and delivers a spike, then nothing. Three hundred KOCs on commission cost you product and a percentage, and they leave a permanent layer of search results. For a brand entering with no reputation, the second option is almost always the right one.

A case: Brett, and a supplement brand that almost gave up

Brett is American. He runs a family-owned supplement company in Colorado, around $30 million in US revenue, strong in magnesium and sleep formulas. He came to us after two years in China that had gone badly.

His numbers when we met: a Tmall Global flagship store open for 22 months, roughly $310,000 of cumulative sales, and about $480,000 spent on the store build, agency retainers and Zhitongche paid traffic. He was losing money on every order. His US distributor partner had told him China was “a big e-commerce market, just list the products”.

What he had already tried and what failed. He ran two livestreams with a mid-tier health KOL, which produced 4,100 units in one evening and almost no repeat orders. He translated his American packaging copy directly, including the phrase “America’s number one sleep formula”, which meant nothing to a Chinese buyer and looked like a claim he could not back up. He bought Tmall search keywords against “magnesium”, competing head-on with By-Health at three times the price.

What we changed. We stopped all paid traffic for two months, which was the hardest conversation. Then we rebuilt the proof layer: third-party lab certificates and elemental magnesium content published in Chinese, 180 KOCs testing the product for eight weeks and posting specific results on sleep latency rather than generic praise, and 40 pieces of comparison content answering “magnesium glycinate versus magnesium oxide” and “how to choose an imported magnesium supplement”. That content was written to be readable by DeepSeek and Doubao, not only by humans. Acquisition moved to Douyin, where the sleep angle could be demonstrated, and every buyer went into a WeChat group with a 30-day refill reminder tied to the dosage schedule.

Why it worked. Brett was never going to beat a Chinese brand on price or shelf presence. He could beat them on a narrow, verifiable claim, backed by documents a sceptical consumer could check, repeated by people who had actually taken the product for two months. The American origin appeared once, in the manufacturing section, as a fact rather than a selling point.

Result after 14 months: $1.9 million in cumulative China revenue, repeat purchase rate at 38 percent, and 44 percent of orders coming through the WeChat private domain at near-zero media cost. Blended CAC dropped from $61 to $19. It is not a rocket ship. It is a business that now funds itself.

Where to sell: the channel decision

You can translate your own website. It will not sell. Chinese consumers buy inside platforms, and the platform you pick shapes your cost structure for years.

Tmall and Tmall Global

Still the largest and still the most demanding. Tmall Global is the cross-border version and the usual first step for an imported brand. It is not for small brands: expect a deposit, an annual fee, and a traffic cost that assumes you are already known. Open a Tmall store because you have demand to capture, not to create demand.

Tmall marketplace for US brands

JD, Douyin and WeChat

JD Worldwide is stronger on electronics, appliances and anything where delivery speed matters, and its own logistics network is a real advantage for heavier or higher-value goods. Douyin is the fastest-growing channel and the one where an unknown American brand can actually get discovered, with a lower barrier to entry than Tmall and much higher operational intensity: content produced continuously, not campaigns. WeChat stores and mini-programs are not a discovery channel at all. That is where you keep the customers you already paid for. Every imported brand with a repeat-purchase product should have one.

Distribution

Selling through Chinese distributors is possible and sometimes right, particularly for food service, B2B and offline retail. Tmall B2D connects brands with online and offline distributors. Be aware of the trade-off: you gain reach and you lose control of pricing, positioning and customer data. Brands that hand the market to a distributor before building any brand equity usually find their product discounted into irrelevance within two years.

Price and service still decide the outcome

Quality expectation covers the whole experience, not just the product. Chinese buyers judge delivery time, packaging condition and how fast customer service answers. A great American product delivered in nine days in a dented box scores worse than an average Chinese product delivered next day. AI-assisted customer service is now standard on Chinese platforms and handles first response in seconds. If your Chinese customer service is a shared inbox checked once a day from Denver, you will lose reviews you did not need to lose.

Price is read as a quality signal, but only inside a band. Too cheap and the imported claim looks false. Too expensive without proof and you get compared to the domestic option and dropped. Work out your landed cost including duty, cross-border tax relief, platform commission and logistics before you set a shelf price, not after.

The French comparison

The contrast with another country brand is instructive. French brands in China still trade on a coherent cultural association: elegance, craft, gastronomy, perfume. That association survives politics because it is aesthetic rather than geopolitical. American brands never had that. Their association was modernity, scale and cool, and Chinese brands now own all three at home. We covered it in why French brands still appeal to Chinese consumers. Read the two side by side and you see what a durable country image is made of.

FAQ

Is it still worth entering China as an American brand in 2026?

In supplements, science-led skincare, premium branded food, pet nutrition and technical outdoor, yes, and the growth rates are better than most Western markets. In fast fashion, mass sportswear, bulk agriculture and mid-market automotive, entering now means fighting a battle that stronger companies are currently losing. The category matters far more than the country. Test the answer to one question before you commit: why would a Chinese consumer pick you over the good domestic alternative at half the price? If you have a specific, provable answer, go.

Should I hide that my brand is American?

No. Hiding it looks evasive, and Chinese consumers will find out in five seconds. State it as a fact where it is relevant, usually in manufacturing origin, testing standards or heritage. Do not build your positioning on it and do not use flag imagery or “America’s number one” style claims. The rule I give clients: origin is a credential, not a slogan. In supplements it carries real weight because it stands for testing standards. In fashion or beverages it carries almost none.

How much budget do I need to test the Chinese market properly?

For a cross-border test on one category with a serious content and KOC programme, plan on $120,000 to $200,000 over twelve months, split roughly 30 percent content and reputation, 40 percent acquisition, 20 percent operations and logistics, 10 percent compliance and registration. Anything under $60,000 buys you a store nobody visits. Anything spent on paid traffic before your search results and reviews exist is spent twice.

Working with us

GMA is a digital marketing agency based in Shanghai, working only on the Chinese market since 2012. We handle market entry for American brands: cross-border and Tmall Global setup, Baidu and Xiaohongshu search, GEO on DeepSeek and Doubao, KOC and affiliate programmes, and WeChat private domain. We tell clients when a category is not worth entering, which is not something an agency paid on media spend usually does.

If you want an honest read on whether your category still works in China, contact us and we will look at your numbers before we talk about a proposal.

GMA agency Shanghai

5 Comments

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Read Next

More from the Blog

All articles →
Business in China

B2B Lead Generation in China

Thijs runs a small Dutch company that builds industrial filtration systems for chemical plants. Two years ago he hired an agency to “do social media in China.” Six months and one WeChat account later, he had 40 inquiries and a lot of enthusiasm. He also had almost nothing to sell to. Two of those 40 […]

Want a Strategy Like This for Your Brand?

Get a free consultation with our China marketing specialists. We'll review your situation and recommend a tailored approach.